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Abstract
In this paper we develop a multi-sector model of firms’ pricing behaviour under imperfect
competition. We allow for the fact that some goods sold will be for final consumption, while
others will be used as intermediate goods in further production. We assume that price setters
are constrained by the existence of Calvo (1983) contracts which enables us to measure the
extent of price inertia across industrial sectors. We further allow for the possibility that some
firms set prices to maximise the discounted value of profits, while others set prices according
to a backward-looking rule-ofthumb. We then estimate the resulting price-setting equations
for 18 US manufacturing industries defined at the SIC 2-digit level over the period 1959 to
1996. We find that there is statistically significant variability in estimates of price stickiness,
ranging from 4 months to almost 1.5 years with significantly more inertia in the setting of
durable goods prices. We also find that estimates of backward-looking price-setting behaviour
vary, with some industries acting in a purely forward-looking manner, while others are
characterized by almost 50 per cent of firms setting prices in a backwardlooking fashion.
Finally we find that firms in less competitive industries (characterized by higher average
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The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which links current inﬂation to
expectations of future inﬂation and a measure of excess demand in the form of
the output gap, has become a mainstay of modern macroeconomics as part of
the ‘New Neo-Classical Synthesis’ (see Goodfriend and King (1997) for a dis-
cussion). However, until recently, this essential building block of contemporary
macroeconomics has been criticized on empirical grounds (see Mankiw and Reis
(2001), for example), largely because it apparently fails to capture the degree of
inﬂation inertia many believe to be a feature of the data. Recent work on the
NKPC based on Calvo’s (1983) overlapping contracts framework (see for exam-
ple Galí and Gertler (1999), Galí et al. (2001), Sbordone (2002) and Leith and
Malley (2002)) suggests that, as a measure of inﬂationary pressures, the out-
put gap is a poor proxy for marginal costs. Accordingly, when a theoretically
coherent NKPC is estimated for the US and Euro-area, using aggregate log-
linearised labor share data as a measure of marginal costs, the NKPC appears
to be a reasonable model of inﬂation.
In this paper we build on the insight of this approach, but extend the analysis
to take account of sectoral diﬀerences in price-setting behavior. Several authors
have noted that monetary policy can have signiﬁcantly diverse impacts on dif-
ferent sectors, with particular attention being paid to the varying responses to
monetary policy of durable and non-durable consumer good sectors (see, for ex-
ample, Galí (1993) and Baxter (1996)). Despite these diﬀerences, most analyses
of optimal monetary policy undertaken as part of the New Neo-Classical Synthe-
sis utilize single-sector models. An exception to this is Erceg and Levin (2002)
who develop a two-sector sticky-price model and demonstrate that welfare de-
pends upon inﬂation and output gaps within each sector, not simply aggregate
variables. In Erceg and Levin (op cit.) the diﬀerences across sectors stem from
demand-side diﬀerences across durable and non-durable goods, but a common
degree of price-stickiness is assumed across sectors. Aoki (2001) also develops
a sectoral model, but focuses on diﬀerences in the degree of price stickiness
across sectors. His analysis suggests that monetary policy should target inﬂa-
tion in the sticky-price sector rather than focusing on an aggregate measure. In
other words, welfare is maximized by reducing the distortions associated with
price stickiness through targeting a measure of ‘core’ inﬂation which is based
on inﬂation in the sticky price sector. Accordingly, any ﬁnding of signiﬁcant
asymmetries in price-setting behavior across sectors should provide evidence on
which to base a ‘core’ measure of inﬂation. Additionally, Bartsky et al. (2003)
suggest that whether or not price stickiness rests in durable or non-durable
goods sectors is crucial in deﬁning the impact of monetary policy on the econ-
omy. Finally, evidence on price changes on individual consumer goods collected
by Bils and Klenow (2002) also suggests signiﬁcant diﬀerences in nominal iner-
tia across sectors. For these reasons, estimating the extent of nominal inertia
across sectors is an important extension of the NKPC approach.
To allow for sectoral diﬀerences in price-setting, we assume that imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms sell their goods to buyers which purchase goods from all sectors
2in the economy. This implies that the ﬁrms take into account the price they
set relative to the prices set by other ﬁrms, both in their own industry and
across the economy as a whole. Additionally, by allowing ﬁrms in one sector
to buy goods from other ﬁrms (both in its sector and in other sectors) for use
in production, we also allow for variations in raw materials and intermediate
goods prices to aﬀect the marginal costs faced by a price-setter.
More speciﬁcally, we construct a model of ﬁrms’ price-setting behavior which
allows ﬁrms to sell their products to consumers, the government and other ﬁrms,
and to substitute intermediate goods for labor in production. In our setup ﬁrms
will set their prices subject to the constraints implied by Calvo contracts. When
ﬁrms are able to adjust prices, some will set the new price to maximize the
discounted value of future proﬁts, while others will follow a simple backward-
looking rule of thumb which, although not optimal in the short-run, will achieve
the proﬁt-maximizing price in the long-run. The possible existence of rule of
thumb price setters may reﬂect information processing costs along the lines of
Sims (1998) and allows us to measure the extent of backward-looking behavior
in price setting. Our formulation gives rise to a speciﬁcation of the NKPC at
the sectoral level.
When we econometrically estimate our speciﬁcation of price-setting behav-
ior for the US manufacturing industries at the 2-digit level, we ﬁnd plausible
estimates of the degree of inertia in each sector. Moreover these results sug-
gest that price setting in durable goods industries is more sticky than in non-
durable goods industries. Our econometric work also suggests that the majority
of ﬁrms set prices optimally, in a forward-looking manner, rather than follow-
ing backward-looking rules of thumb. It also appears to be the case that ﬁrms
with more market-power (as measured by the mark-up) adjust prices less fre-
quently than ﬁrms in more competitive industries. They are also more likely to
follow simple backward-looking rules of thumb when they do adjust price. Ad-
ditionally, as one would expect, the variability of output (inﬂation) is positively
(negatively) correlated with our estimate of price stickiness. Finally, our results
imply that there are signiﬁcant asymmetries in the degree of price-stickiness
among industrial sectors as well as asymmetries in the degree of backward-
looking behavior in price setting, which as pointed out above may be a cause
for concern for policy makers in the Fed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the
importance of materials/intermediate goods costs to manufacturing ﬁrms. In
Section 3 we derive our sectoral NKPCs in the presence of intermediate/material
good inputs. In Section 4 we estimate the model for 18 2-digit US manufacturing
industries. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
32 Intermediate Inputs in US Manufacturing
The importance of material costs within US manufacturing industries is high-
lighted in Table 1 which gives, along with other descriptive statistics, aver-
age values between 1958 and 1996 for the ratio of production worker wage
costs, Wi ∗ Hi to variable costs (deﬁned as wage costs plus material costs,
Pm,i ∗ mi). The table also details the average ratio of production worker wage
costs to gross output, Pi ∗ yi and the ratio of material costs to gross output.
The ﬁnal column calculates the price-cost mark-up implicit in each industry as
Value Added - Production Worker Payroll
Value Added+Cost of Materials , following Domowitz et al. (1988).
Table 1 - Mark-up & Costs in US Manufacturing Industries1






Agg. Manufacturing 0.169 0.115 0.682 0.319
20 0.085 0.063 0.673 0.265
21 0.090 0.071 0.717 0.234
22 0.205 0.155 0.598 0.246
23 0.261 0.185 0.519 0.304
24 0.221 0.168 0.590 0.251
25 0.279 0.187 0.482 0.333
26 0.178 0.121 0.557 0.317
27 0.302 0.154 0.350 0.500
28 0.116 0.064 0.485 0.450
29 0.029 0.025 0.831 0.141
30 0.235 0.152 0.493 0.355
31 0.259 0.180 0.512 0.306
32 0.266 0.163 0.450 0.384
33 0.172 0.128 0.617 0.247
34 0.248 0.165 0.499 0.334
35 0.242 0.145 0.462 0.388
37 0.160 0.114 0.595 0.287
39 0.247 0.154 0.465 0.386
>From the ﬁrst three columns in Table 1 it is clear that material/intermediate
goods costs are a far more signiﬁcant part of variable costs than labor costs for
all the 2-digit manufacturing industries considered in the table. This suggests
that failing to take account of the impact of changes in materials prices on
marginal costs may lead to a serious misspeciﬁcation of estimated price-setting
equations. To illustrate the potential importance of this misspeciﬁcation we
estimate a reduced form NKPC of the following form,
b πt = α1Etb πt+1 + α2 d MCt + εt (1)
1The data used in this table are fully described in Appendix 1. Note that data limitations
prevent the use of industries 36 and 38 (see Appendix 1 for SIC deﬁnitions and further detail
on sources and methods).
4using aggregate US manufacturing. We estimate2 this using three alternative
measures of marginal cost: (1) the output gap, (2) the ratio of production worker
payroll costs to gross output and (3) the ratio of labor plus material costs to
gross output.
The results of this estimation using the traditional output gap measure of
marginal costs are given by,
b πt =1 .501
(4.315)
Etb πt+1 − 0.105
(−1.381)
d MC1t + ε1t. (2)
Here there is the usual problem that the coeﬃcient on the output gap is both
statistically insigniﬁcant and wrongly-signed (see Galí et al. (2001) for a dis-
cussion in the context of aggregate US and Euro-area data). The coeﬃcient on
expected inﬂation is also in excess of one. If we replace the output gap measure
of marginal costs with the detrended ratio of production worker payroll cost to
gross output3, the estimates become,
b πt =1 .03881
(11.264)
Etb πt+1 − 0.105
(−2.977)
d MC2t + ε2t. (3)
In this case, the coeﬃcient on the ‘marginal cost’ measure is not only wrongly-
signed it is also statistically signiﬁcant. It appears that the usual labor share
measure does not work in the case of US manufacturing industries. Finally,
we run the same regression but replace our measure of marginal costs with the
ratio of production workers’ payroll plus intermediate inputs relative to gross
output4. The estimates are as follows,
b πt =0 .998
(8.988)
Etb πt+1 +0 .138
(2.288)
d MC3t + ε3t. (4)
Now the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the marginal cost measure are of the cor-
rect sign and magnitude, as well as being statistically signiﬁcant. This section
therefore suggests not only that intermediate goods are a signiﬁcant part of
manufacturing ﬁrms’ variable costs, but that failing to take account of this fact
implies that estimates of price inertia based on the NKPC may be signiﬁcantly
biased.
2The reduced-form NKPC is estimated using Hansen’s (1982) Generalised Method of Mo-
m e n t s( G M M ) ,w i t hf o u rl a g so fo u t p u tp r i c ei n ﬂation, commodity price inﬂation and a
constant term as instruments. All data have been quadratically detrended to reﬂect the
non-linear trends present in both the industry level inﬂation and marginal cost data. The
estimated standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to both serial correlated and het-
eroscedastic errors. When calculating the HAC covariance matrix of sample moments we use
a value of four for the lag truncation parameter. The results reported above are also robust
to alternative values of this parameter ranging from 2 to 12.
3This is slightly diﬀerent from the labour share variable used in aggregate studies in two
ways. Firstly it is based only on production workers and secondly, these are measured relative
to gross output, rather than a value-added deﬁnition of output. The theory derived in Section
3 below, will show this to be the appropriate measure.
4This measure is intended to be a proxy for marginal costs when material costs are impor-
tant. Section 3 will, however, develop a more theoretically coherent measure which will be
employed in the structural estimation of Section 4.
53 The Model
In this section we analyze a model of ﬁrms’ price setting behavior which takes
account of the sectoral composition of the domestic economy and allows a sig-
niﬁcant role for material/intermediate goods costs in the determination of ﬁrms’
marginal costs. To do so we assume that imperfectly competitive ﬁrms sell their
goods to buyers which purchase goods from all sectors in the economy. This im-
plies that the ﬁrms take into account the price they set relative to the prices set
by other ﬁrms, both in their own industry and across the economy as a whole.
We further assume that ﬁrms face the constraints in price-setting implied by the
use of Calvo (1983) contracts, in that they can only change their prices after a
random interval of time. Within this constraint, we also allow ﬁrms to adopt
two forms of price-setting behavior. Some ﬁrms set prices by maximizing the
expected discounted value of future proﬁts, while the remaining ﬁrms choose to
follow a simple rule of thumb which updates their prices in line with inﬂation
and the price changes they observed in the previous period.
3.1 Product Demand
We ﬁrst turn to consider the demand for the ﬁrm’s product. There are N sectors
in the economy. We allow for the possibility that goods produced in one sector
are not identical in the impact they have on utility. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
consumers maximize the utility generated by consumption of CES bundles of
















t is a CES index of consumer goods produced in sector i consumed by
consumer j. We do not specify the exact way in which these bundles produced
by diﬀerent sectors enter utility. However, it should be borne in mind that
there is an implicit model of utility maximization which allocates an individual’s
consumption spending across time. This can be the usual consumption Euler
equation or can include more complex dynamics, such as those arising from
habits eﬀects as in Leith and Malley (2002) or the possibility that some goods
are durable, as in Erceg and Levin (2002). However, in analyzing ﬁrms’ pricing
decisions we only require knowledge of how consumers, the government and
other ﬁrms allocate their spending across ﬁrms within a given sector, not how
the spending is allocated across time. The price index associated with the goods









where pt(i,z) is the price set by ﬁrm z in sector i at time t.
6We also assume that ﬁrms demand goods for use in production and m
i,z
t is
a CES aggregate of the intermediate goods produced by other ﬁrms and used



















Note that the parameterization of the CES aggregate is sector speciﬁc. Accord-
ingly we can also deﬁne a price index associated with the use of intermediate





























where we sum across each sector’s demand for intermediate goods produced in








(c(i)t + g(i)t + m(i)t) (10)
where m(i)t is the demand for the basket of products produced in sector i for
use as an intermediate good in the production of all ﬁrms in the economy. This












i nt h ec a s eo fﬁrm j,w h e r em(i,z)
j
t
is that part of that part of ﬁrm j’s demand allocated to ﬁrm z within sector i.
Note that we do not impose the same degree of substitutability between sectoral
output when used for consumption rather than production. Accordingly the
aggregate consumer price level may diﬀer from the index of intermediate goods
prices. The demand for the ﬁrm’s product depends upon its price relative to the
prices of other producers in its sector, as well as the amount of public and private
consumption and intermediate goods demand allocated to each sectors’ goods
where these proportions depend on the relative prices between sectors and the
speciﬁcation of the consumers’ utility function and the governments’ objective
function. Therefore, we are allowing for substitution in demand between intra-
and inter-sectoral goods, in describing the demand for sector i’s representative
ﬁrm’s product.
73.2 Deﬁning Marginal Cost
We now turn to consider the form of the ﬁrm’s production function. We assume


















where H(i,z)t is the quantity of labor of workers of type i used in production
by ﬁrm z and m
i,z
t is a CES aggregate of the intermediate goods produced by

















We model all these inputs as imperfect substitutes and ρi measures the elasticity
of substitution between them. Firms also possess a stock of capital, Ki,w h i c h
is assumed, for simplicity, to be ﬁxed and 1 − 1
ψi describes the weight given to
capital in production.
Here the ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization together reveal the cost-















































































∂y(i,z)t (from equations 14 and 15) we can
decompose marginal cost into two elements - one which is independent of the
ﬁrm’s actions and the other which depends upon the position they are operating













































=( y(i,z)t)ψi−1 g MC
i
t. (17)
The ﬁrst multiplicative term captures the increase in ﬁrm speciﬁc marginal costs
through increasing production given the ﬁxed stock of capital5 and decreasing
marginal returns to the remaining factors. The second element reﬂects the labor
costs that enter into the costs of production and are constant across ﬁrms in
the sector. We label this second term, g MC
i
t.
3.3 Proﬁt Maximizing Price Setting
We can now start to consider the problem facing a ﬁrm which chooses to set its
price in order to maximize proﬁts. The real variable proﬁts6 (deﬂated by the
general price index, since the ﬁrms are assumed to be owned by consumers who
all face the same form of consumption bundle) in period t of the ﬁrm producing















We also allow for the possibility that labor markets are sector speciﬁc, such that
Wi
t is the wage rate applicable to sector i, although there may be signiﬁcant
labor ﬂows between sectors acting to equate wage rate, ceteris paribus.S u c h
ﬁrms are able to change their price with probability αi in a given period, so
that 1
1−αi measures the length of time a price contract is expected to exist.
This allows us to write the problem facing a ﬁrm which is able to change prices
5An alternative modelling strategy would be to allow capital to be reallocated across ﬁrms
so as to equate the shadow value of capital, implying that each ﬁrm’s marginal cost is identical
to the economy-wide average cost (see Sbordone (2002) for a discussion). However, the pos-
sibility that ﬁrms can reallocate capital without friction, but cannot reset prices continuously
seems implausible.
6We ignore the ﬁxed costs of utilising the capital stock in formulating the ﬁrm’s problem
a n dw ea s s u m et h a ta l ls h o c k sa r es u ﬃciently small that ﬁrms continue to earn positive proﬁts
at all points in time. Accordingly, the deﬁnition of labour we are considering here is production
workers. For simplicity we assume that other workers payroll costs contribute to overheads
which can be thought of as an element of ﬁxed costs.


































































Here proﬁts are discounted at the gross real rate of interest, rt. Due to the ability
of consumers to hold diversiﬁed portfolios and thereby pool the risks associated
with staggered price setting (the only source of risk formally modelled) this
discount factor will be the same across ﬁrms. The ﬁrst order condition for this






















































t = d g MC
i
t +( ψi − 1)b yi








)sEt[ d g MC
i
t+s +( ψi − 1)b yi
t+s (21)
+b Pt+s + θi(ψi − 1) b Pi
t+s]
where yt = ci
t+gi
t+mi
t is the average ﬁrm’s gross output supplying, private and
public demand. This inﬁnite forward summation, can also be quasi-diﬀerenced
to give a ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation describing the evolution of the optimal









t − d g MC
i
t − (ψi − 1)b yi
t − b Pt − θi(ψi − 1)b Pi
t. (22)
The ﬁrms which do not perform this optimization, instead follow a rule of
thumb whereby they set a price equal to the average price set on the previous
period after scaling this up by the rate of inﬂa t i o no b s e r v e di nt h ep r e v i o u s
period. Therefore, the log-linearised index of output prices in sector i is given
by,
b Pi
t = αi b Pi





t is the average reset price in sector i in period t and is given by,
b p
i,r
t =( 1− ωi)b xi
t + ωib p
i,b
t (24)
ωi is the proportion of ﬁrms following the rule of thumb, and p
i,b
t is the price
set set according to the rule of thumb,
b p
i,b
t = b p
i,r
t−1 + b π
i
t−1. (25)
Substituting equation (25) into (24) gives,
b p
i,r
t =( 1− ωi)b xi
t + ωib p
i,r
t−1 + ωi b Pi
t−1 − ωi b Pi
t−2. (26)



















t−1 − ωi b Pi
t−2. (27)
This can be rearranged in terms of b xi
t, substituted into equation (25) and solved
using the deﬁnition of output price inﬂation in sector i, b π
i
t = b Pi















(1 − ωi)(1 − αi)(1 − αiβ)
(1 + (ψi − 1)θi)λi
( d g MC
i
t (28)
+(ψi − 1)b yi
t + b Pt − b Pi
t)

































t − b Pt)
where wi,m = W
i
P
m,i and wi = W
i
P . In other words, marginal costs depend upon
the price of labor, c Wi
t − b Pt and the price of materials/intermediate goods for use
in production, b P
m,i
t − b Pt as well as the extent of diminishing marginal returns
to these two inputs when capital is ﬁx e di nt h es h o r t — r u n ,w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db y
(ψi − 1)b yi
t.
Appendix 2 then details the transformation of this speciﬁcation into a form














(1 − ωi)(1 − αi)(1 − αiβ)























































t − b Pi
t +( ψi − 1)b yi
t).
where b si
t = c Wi
t − b Pi
t + b Hi
t −b yi
t is the deviation of the ratio of labor costs to gross
output, b w
i,m
t = c Wi
t − b P
i,m
t is the wage rate deﬂated by the price of materials
in industry i, b P
m,i
t − b Pi
t are the price of materials deﬂated by the output price
of industry i and b yi
t is gross output. We respecify the Phillips curve in this
way, to make it comparable to existing studies which focus on the labor share
variable, b si
t and to allow estimation of the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods and labor in production, ρi. If no intermediate goods are
used in production then this reduces to the Phillips curve employed in, for
example, Galí et al. (2001) and Leith and Malley (2002, 2003). However, as we
saw in Table 1, at the sectoral level, material inputs are a major source of costs
which should be accounted for in the ﬁrm’s pricing decision.
4 Estimation and Empirical Results
In this Section we jointly estimate the parameters of the model derived in Section
2 for 18 2-digit manufacturing industries over the period 1958(2) to 1996(3)7.
This implies the estimation of 109 parameters (i.e. 5x18+1 ‘deep’ parameters
and 1x18 steady-state ratios) with only 150 observations. To reduce this problem
to more manageable dimensions we ﬁrst calibrate θi, ψi and the steady-state
ratio of production worker payroll to variable costs, W i∗Hi
Wi∗Hi+P m,i∗mi (see Table
1) since these are readily identiﬁable from the data8.This is also the general
approach adopted in much of the literature estimating Phillips curves using
aggregate data (see, for example, Galí et al. (2001)) where ψi is typically inferred
from labor-share data and the mark-up is based upon survey evidence and/or
cited empirical studies.
Under imperfect competition the above parameters are calibrated as follows
7Note that all of the data employed in the estimation of our NKPCs are seasonally adjusted
and that industries 36 and 38 had to be dropped due to insuﬃcient observations for W.F u r t h e r
detail on data availability are reported in Appendix 1.
8Note that we use the mean value of these parameters and the steady-state ratio over
the estimation period. Further note that all of the estimations reported below are robust to
alternative values of these parameters, e.g. median values, end of sample values and various





















iyi is the labor and intermediate goods share (can also be im-
plied from Table 1).
Moreover, conditioning on these relatively well known parameters allows us
to concentrate on the estimating the remaining 55 parameters. These parame-
ters include ﬁrms’ steady-state discount factor, β, the probability that a ﬁrm in
sector i can reset their price in period t, αi, the proportion of ﬁrms following
rule of thumb pricing behavior in time t, ωi and the parameter measuring the
elasticity of substitution between labor and imported intermediate goods, ρi for
each industry. We compare the estimates across sectors and this allows us to
draw a number of conclusions of direct relevance to policy makers.
4.1 Empirical Considerations and Estimator
Given that our model incorporates forward looking rational expectations (RE),
we employ Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
which easily handles the set of orthogonality conditions suggested by the RE
hypothesis9. To illustrate how we apply GMM to obtain parameter estimates
and speciﬁcation consistent standard errors, consider the following system of
nonlinear equations given by the 18 sectoral NKPCs characterized by (30),
yt = f(θ,xt)+ut (33)











SIC-code; θ is the (55x1) vector of unknown parameters, [θ20(= α20,ω20,β,ρ20)






t , b y20
t , b P
m,20
t − b P20
t ), b w
20,m
t ); x21t,...,x39t)]010;and ut is
the (18x1) vector of errors [u20
t ,...u 39
t ]0.
The r orthogonality conditions for our model can be written as follows
9Although several recent papers question the roubustness of GMM in this context (see
Rudd and Whelan (2002) and Lindé (2003)), the paper by Galí et al., 2003 convincingly
refutes these claims.
10Note that calibrating θi, ψi,a n d Wi∗Hi
Wi∗Hi+Pm,i∗mi , using the data, serves to combine




t − b Pi
t which explains





Et[y20t − f20(θ,xt)]zt =0
.
.








0 ; zt is
a (5x1) vector of instruments [b πt−1,b st−1, b yt−1,b π
c
t−1,c o n s t a n tt e r m ]0; b π, b s, b y
refer to aggregate manufacturing detrended inﬂation, labor’s share and out-
put respectively and b π
c, to commodity price inﬂation. Finally we assume that
Et(zt,ut)=0 . Further note that all hatted variables are calculated as devia-
tions away from a quadratic trend11.
Given the above setup we obtain the GMM estimate of the unknown para-




















T is an estimate of the inverse of the covariance matrix of sample
moments. To obtain standard errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form, we calculate b S using the Newey and West
(1987) estimator,
b ST = b Γ0,T +
q X
v=1
{1 − [v/(q +1 ) ] }(b Γv,T + b Γ0
v,T) (36)
where
b Γv,T =+ ( 1 /T)
T X
t=v+1
[h(b θ,wt)][h(b θ,wt−v)]0 (37)
and q is the lag truncation parameter12. Finally to test the validity of our overi-
dentifying restrictions we calculate Hansen’s J − statistic which is distributed
χ2(r − a) where r and a denote the number of orthogonality conditions and
parameters respectively. For our estimation a =5 5and r = 18(4 + 1) = 90, i.e.
18 equations, 4 instruments plus a constant, therefore J˜χ2(35).
4.2 Interpretation of Results
The results of estimating the system of 18 2-digit industries are detailed in Ta-
ble 2. Descriptions of the industries corresponding to the SIC codes can be
11This reﬂects the non-linear trends present in both the industry level inﬂation and marginal
cost data.
12In the estimations reported in Table 2, the value of q is equal to 4. Note that we use the
Bartlett spectral density kernal to insure the positive deﬁniteness of the covariance matrix of
the orthogonality conditions (see Newey and West, 1987). Further note that these results are
extremely robust to alternative values of q, e.g. we examined values ranging from 2 to 12. To
preserve space, these results are not reported but will be made available on request.
14found in Appendix 1. There are several things to note about these results.
Firstly, with the exception of industries 20 and 29 (Food and Petroleum Reﬁn-
ing, respectively) all estimates of the degree of price-stickiness are statistically
signiﬁcant and plausible. Of the remaining industries, the most ﬂexible indus-
try is 24 (Lumber and Wood Products (exc. Furniture) and the least, ﬂexible
37 (Transportation Equipment). In most industries there is also a signiﬁcant
degree of backward-looking behavior, although the majority of prices are set in
ap r o ﬁt-maximizing manner13.
With the exception of industry 21 - Tobacco Products, which has an esti-
mated elasticity of substitution between labor and intermediate goods of 5.99
with an associated t − stat. of 3.06, the degree of substitutability between la-
bor and intermediate goods is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. A likely
explanation of this result is that, at the quarterly frequency, there is little scope
for meaningful substitution between labor and intermediate goods such that a
Leontief production function is the most accurate description of the short-run
production technology. However, it is important to note that even if ρi =0
in a particular industry this does not remove intermediate goods from the de-
ﬁnition of marginal costs - in fact, it simply means that there is limited scope
for substitution between the two inputs being used to moderate the impact of
ﬂuctuations in labor and intermediate goods costs on marginal costs.
The ﬁnal parameter estimated within the system is the discount factor which
is common across ﬁrms. This has a point estimate of 0.93 with an associated
t−stat. of 22.2. These are in line with the estimates in Galí and Gertler (2001)
using aggregate US data. While this estimate implies a discount factor which is
higher than that typically assumed in specifying consumer preferences, it may
simply reﬂect undiversiﬁable risk (not formally modelled in the current paper)
common to US manufacturing ﬁrms.
13Further relationships between the estimated parameters and other stylised descriptions of
each industry are discussed below.
15Table 2 - Estimation Results































































































(8.79) 10 months 0.76
The J −test is 30.45 with a p−value of 0.687. Note that application of a series
of unit root tests (e.g. Dickey-Fuller, weighted symetric and Phillip-Perron) indicated
that the errors for each industry were stationary. This ﬁnding was not only robust
across the various tests employed but also across lag lengths chosen to conduct the
test (e.g. 2 to 12). These results are not reported here to preserve space but will be
made available on request.
16We can also assess the extent to which these results are statistically sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent across industries. To do so, we ﬁrst compare results across
durable and non-durable goods industries in Table 3.


































The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
Table 3 reveals that, as a general rule, prices in durable goods industries
(SIC 24,25, 32-39) are more sticky than those in non-durable goods (SIC 20-
23, 26-31) industries with average price contract durations of 10.7 months in
durable goods industries compared with only 7.9 months in non-durable goods
industries and an overall manufacturing sector average of 9.5 months14. The dif-
ferences in these estimated probabilities of price change are also statistically sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent, at the 1% level, across the durable/non-durable categories.
This seems plausible given that production lags in durable goods industries is
likely to be longer and prices may be negotiated in advance of delivery. This
is, however, apparently in contrast to the frequency of price change observed
across 350 consumer goods by Bils and Klenow (2002) who ﬁnd no statistically-
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in price setting behavior across durable and non-durable
sectors. However, as noted by Barsky et al., consumer prices of durable goods
are likely to be less sticky than producer prices (especially if goods are bun-
dled at the producer level), such that our estimates are actually consistent with
this evidence. There is less diﬀerence in the proportion of backward-looking
ﬁrms in these broad categories - 33% of ﬁr m si nd u r a b l eg o o d si n d u s t r i e sa r e
backward-looking compared with 37% in non-durable goods industries and an
overall average of 35%.
We also undertake pair-wise Wald tests of the statistical signiﬁcance of the
diﬀerence between the average number of months it takes to adjust prices in each
pair of industries. Table 4 details the results of these comparisons and shows that
the majority of industry speciﬁc estimates of the extent of nominal inertia are
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across industries. For example, the number
of -3.5 months in cell (21,22) indicates that price contracts typically last for 3.5
months less in industry 21 compared to industry 22. Table 5, performs the same
analysis with the estimated extent of backward-looking behavior in price-setting
and ﬁnds, similarly, that there is evidence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in pricing behavior across industries.
14Note that SIC 20 and 29 are excluded from these calculations and from those which follow
in Tables 4-6 since the parameter estimates for these industries were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in Table 2.
17A key advantage of our sectoral approach is that we can also assess the cor-
relations between the cross-section of estimated parameters and other relevant
industry-speciﬁc data. This is done in Tables 6a-6c which computes correlation
coeﬃcients between the sectoral parameter estimates, the mark-up in each in-
dustry and the extent of output and inﬂation variability15. These correlations
are also broken down into durable and non-durable goods industries. Here sev-
eral interesting patterns emerge. Firstly, there is a clear positive correlation
between the degree of price-stickiness and the extent of backward-looking be-
havior, which in turn are both positively correlated with the estimated mark-up.
In other words, the less competitive an industry (as captured by the size of the
mark-up) the more sticky its price-setting behavior and the less likely it is to
set prices in a forward-looking manner. The positive correlation between price
stickiness and mark-up is also found in the study by Bils and Klenow (2002).
This is particularly true in the case of durable goods industries, where the du-
ration of price contracts is strongly correlated with the mark-up, and where
there is also a strong negative correlation between both the mark-up and price
contract duration and inﬂation variability. Another intuitive result (which is
conﬁrmed in Bils and Klenow (op cit.)) is that there is a clear positive correla-
tion between output variability and the extent of price stickiness and a negative
relationship between inﬂation variability and price stickiness. Given the highly
stylized nature of the theoretical and econometric speciﬁcations, these oﬀ-model
correlations between the estimated degree of price stickiness and the variability
of output and inﬂation are very encouraging. Finally we should note that these
asymmetries across industries are likely to be of concern to monetary policy
makers for the reasons discussed in the introduction.
Table 6a - Patterns in the Estimates - All Industries
αi ωi µi Var(yi) Var(πi)
αi 1
ωi 0.53 1
µi 0.30 0.33 1
Var(yi) 0.42 0.33 -0.07 1
Var(πi) -0.69 -0.23 -0.32 0.09 1
Table 6b - Patterns in the Estimates - Durable Goods Industries
αi ωi µi Var(yi) Var(πi)
αi 1
ωi 0.51 1
µi 0.50 0.23 1
Var(yi) 0.37 0.33 -0.03 1
Var(πi) -0.80 -0.31 -0.69 0.21 1
15Output variability is measured as the average squared deviation of the logarithm of output
from a quadratic trend. Inﬂation variability is the same measure for inﬂation.
18Table 6c - Patterns in the Estimates - Non-Durable Goods Industries
αi ωi µi Var(yi) Var(πi)
αi 1
ωi 0.57 1
µi 0.24 0.53 1
Var(yi) 0.28 0.41 -0.03 1
Var(πi) -0.57 -0.07 -0.07 -0.30 1
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we developed a sectoral model of ﬁrms’ pricing behavior, where
imperfectly competitive ﬁrms sell their products to consumers as ﬁnal goods
and/or to other ﬁrms for use as intermediate goods in production. We allowed
our ﬁrms to utilize labor, intermediate goods and capital in production and
we assume that ﬁrms are subject to the constraints implied by Calvo (1983)
contracts. This allows us to develop sectoral New Keynesian Phillips Curves,
which, when estimated econometrically, yield measures of the degree of price
stickiness in each industry. Our speciﬁcation also discriminates between ﬁrms
which set prices in a manner consistent with proﬁt-maximization and ﬁrms
which follow simpler, backward-looking, rules of thumb in adjusting the prices
they set.
Estimating these Phillips curves for 18 2-digit manufacturing industries in
the US over the period 1959 to 1996, yields industry-speciﬁc estimates of the
average length of price contracts which range from just over 4 months to almost
1.5 years. There is statistically signiﬁcant variation between industries, which
implies that the sectoral response to monetary policy is likely to be quite dif-
ferent, with durable goods industries typically suﬀering from more inertia than
non-durable goods industries. We also ﬁnd that the majority of ﬁrms’ set prices
in a forward-looking manner consistent with proﬁt-maximization. However,
most industries also have a signiﬁcant degree of backward-looking behavior in
price-setting and this tendency is more pronounced in less competitive industries
which are characterized by higher average mark-ups.
These results are of interest to policy makers for a number of reasons. The
ﬁr s ti st h a ts i g n i ﬁcant asymmetries in price-setting behavior across industries
will aﬀect the construction of a ‘core’ measure of inﬂation, the targeting of which
would minimize the distortions due to staggered price-setting behavior (see Aoki
(2001)). Moreover, the fact that there appears to be signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in price setting behavior across durable and non-durable goods industries is
also crucial in determining the aggregate impact of monetary policy on the
economy (see Bartsky et al. (2003). Aside from these points, the estimates
also imply signiﬁcant sectoral diﬀerences in response to monetary policy which
are important in and of themselves if policy makers are concerned about the
composition of industrial structure.
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21Appendix 1 - Data Appendix
Monthly data
Survey evidence in the US, suggests that diﬀerent products are subject to
quite diﬀerent degrees of price stickiness. For example, Carlton (1986) ﬁnds
evidence of price stickiness ranging from 4 to 13 months. Given this, we must
ensure that the data used in our estimation is at least as frequent as the lowest
estimate of price inertia. This rules out for example the use of annual data since
1/(1−α), i.e. the average number of months that prices remained ﬁxed, would
be constrained to be no less than one year.
Given the above, to estimate the NKPC developed in the theory requires
that we employ data with a minimum of a quarterly frequency for the following
variables: real gross output, yi; implicit gross output deﬂator, Pi;n u m b e ro f
production worker hours hours, Hi; average hourly production worker wage,
Wi; number of production workers, Ni; real intermediate inputs, mi and the
implicit price deﬂator for intermediate inputs, Pm,i. Unfortunately, data at
the 2-digit SIC level for the above variables are only available for Wi at the
monthly frequency from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Employment,
Hours and Earnings (EHE). Whilst the BLS also reports monthly employment
and prices on a sub-aggregate manufacturing basis there are several problems
with these measures in the context of our research. First the employment data
is for total and not production workers and second the producer price indices
are not the correct conceptual match for the gross output deﬂator nor are they
provided in the desired industry breakdown. For example, these data are only
reported on a SIC basis from the mid-1980’s. The longer historical time-series
published for producer prices are on a commodity basis. Further note that the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) monthly indices of industrial production are also
not a precise match for gross output since these are value-added based indices.
Finally, higher frequency industry level data (i.e. quarterly or monthly) for
intermediate inputs and their corresponding prices is simply not available.
Annual Data
The data provided in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Productivity Database has the major advantage that its measures provide an
exact match with the requirements of the theory. However, its main disadvan-
tage, as discussed above, is that we require at least quarterly data to undertake
meaningful estimation of the NKPC. Since we have higher frequency data for
Wi, we need a method of distributing the annual NBER time-series for yi, Pi,
Hi, Ni, mi,a n dPm,i across higher frequency values. Here we will distribute to
the quarterly frequency using a method, which relies on quarterly related series
and yields best linear unbiased estimates of the missing observations (see below
for a brief description of the distribution method employed).
22Quarterly Data
The monthly data for Wi are converted to a quarterly frequency by averag-
ing over all the observations within each quarter. To obtain estimates for the
remaining data we employ a procedure which relies on estimating the relation-
ship between our annual NBER data and the related quarterly series obtained
from the BLS and FRB. As discussed above, whilst the measures from these
sources do not provide the exact conceptual match with the theory, they will
nonetheless be highly correlated with the annual measures and as such will act
useful proxies for quarterly movements in the NBER data. Given there is not a
one-to-one mapping between the series measured by BLS/FRB and the NBER
data it is clearly preferable to use the former data to proxy missing quarterly
movements in the NBER data instead of employing these data as direct proxies
for the NBER annual data. Finally note that all of the quarterly data employed
in the estimation of our NKPCs are seasonally adjusted and that industries 36
and 38 (see below for SIC deﬁnitions) had to be dropped due to insuﬃcient
observations for Wi (i.e. only reported from 1988Q1).
A Random Walk Model for Distributing Annual to Quar-
terly Observations
To estimate the unobserved quarterly movements in the annual NBER data
we employ the method developed by Fernandez (1981). The Fernadez approach
generalizes the model set out Chol and Lin (1971) by allowing for non-stationary
errors in the linear stochastic relationship generating the missing observations.




will estimate quarterly values, yt,1,y t,2,y t,3,y t,4 for each t =1 ...,n so that the
within year average of the quarterly series is equal to the observed annual value
provided by the NBER, e.g.
ya
t =
(yt,1 + yt,2 + yt3 + yt,4)
4
. (38)
Moreover when estimating the quarterly values we follow Fernandez (1981)
and further assume that the unobserved quarterly series follows a linear sto-
chastic relationship with a set of k related observed quarterly series and the
error term follows a random walk. For example, the stochastic relation for each
quarter i of year t can be written as follows:
yt,i = x1
t,iβ1 + x2
t,iβ2 + ... + xk
t,iβk + ut,i (39)
where ut,i = ut,i−1 + εt,i.
The 4nx1 vector U =( u1,1 u1,2... un,4) is assumed to have a zero mean and
23a covariance matrix (D0D)−1,w h e r et h e4nx4n D matrix is given by
D =

     

10 0 0 .... 00
−110 0 .... 00
0 −110.... 00
.. . . . .
.. . . . .
00 0 0 ....−11

     

. (40)
Finally the errors εt,i are assumed to be white noise with a zero mean
and constant variance σ2. Given these assumptions the Fernandez estimator
is BLUE since var(U)=( D0D)−1σ2.
To estimate the β
0s in (39) we require a nx4n distribution matrix B,. e . g
B =( 1 /4)










     

. (41)




and the 4nx1 vector of unobserved quarterly observations as Y =( y1,1,y 1,2,...,yn,4)0
then from (41) it follows that,
Ya = BY = BXβ + Bu = Xaβ + ua. (42)
B a s e do nt h eC h o wa n dL i n( op cit.) analysis it can be easily shown that the
optimal linear unbiased estimator for the unobserved higher frequency move-
ments in Y is given by
b Y = Xb β +( D0D)−1B0(B(D0D)−1B0)−1b Ua (43)
where b β =[ X
a0(B(D0D)−1B0)−1Xa]−1Xa0(B(D0D)−1B0)−1Ya, Xa = BX and
b Ua = Ya − Xab β.
Principle Components of the Related Regressors
The next issue which needs to be confronted when applying the estimator
given by (43) pertains to the choice of the appropriate k quarterly related regres-
s o r sw h i c hm a k eu pt h ec o l u m n so fX. As discussed above, since the available
higher frequency BLS/FRB data is not an exact match with the measures re-
quired by the theory and in some case with the required industry breakdown,
we need to make use of an extended information set in an eﬀort to maximize
the ﬁt with our annual NBER measures. For example, to distribute Ni to a
quarterly frequency there are 24 employment related variables available from
the BLS. The BLS also provides another 21 hours related variables to distribute
Hi and 43 producer prices to distribute Piand Pm,i. Finally, the FRB provides
2423 industrial production indices which we will use to distribute yi and mi.A
full description of these variables and their sources is given below. The obvi-
ous advantage of having access to such a large set of related regressors for each
variable is that they will not only capture within industry correlations but also
the cross industry correlations arising from underlying complementarities and
substitutabilities in production. The disadvantage however is that it is impossi-
ble to know apriori which regressors to include and which to exclude. Variable
exclusion is necessary to conserve degrees of freedom and to avoid the problems
associated with multicollinearity.
To reduce the dimensionality of our various related regressor sets we apply
the technique of principal components. For example, the regression given by
(42) above can be transformed as follows
Ya = BXβ + Bu =( BXP)(P0β)+Bu = BZθ + Bu (44)
where Ya is an annual nx1 vector from the NBER dataset; BX (= Xa) is an
annualized nxk matrix of related regressors; B is the nx4n distribution matrix;
X is the 4nxk matrix of quarterly related regressors; Bu is the annualized nx1
vector of errors; u is the 4nx1 vector of quarterly errors; P is an orthogonal
kxk matrix whose columns are the characteristic vectors of XX
0;BZ = BXP
is the annualized nxk matrix of principal components; θ=P0β is the kx1 vector
of coeﬃcients; and b θ =( BZ
0BZ)−1BZ
0Ya.
Note that the above transformation has not yet provided the dimension-
reduction we require since the size of the Z matrix of orthogonal principle com-
ponents is the same as the related regressor matrix X. Hence we next brieﬂy
describe the procedure and decision criteria by which the number of columns of
Z are reduced to a smaller set which still contain most of the information from
the larger set. We start by calculating the correlation matrix R of the normal-
ized columns of X. The normalization undertaken is to divide the deviation of
each variable from its mean by its standard deviations. Thus the total variance
of the normalized X matrix is equal to k or the number of variables. When the
dimension of Z i st h es a m ea sX the orthogonal vectors comprising Z explain all
of the variance in normalized X. Accordingly the objective of principle compo-
nents is to explain as much of the total variance as possible with the least number
of principle components or factors. The manner in which the principle factors
are calculated, extracting consecutive factors accounts for less and less variance.
For example, the fraction of variance explained by each additional factor, FVi
is calculated by ﬁrst obtaining the characteristic equation of R which is a poly-
nomial of degree k resulting from expanding the determinant of |R − λI| =0
and solving for the eigenvalues λi (i =1 ..k),where
P
λi = tr(R)=k. The kx1
vector FV vector is then calculated as FV = T0λ/k,w h e r eλ is arranged in the
order of the largest to smallest eigenvalue and T is an upper triangular matrix
with zeros below the diagonal and ones on and above the diagonal. The deci-
sion rule we employ with respect to how many principle components to retain
is that they must explain 99% of the variance of normalized X. This results
in our various related regressor sets being reduced to the following number of
25principle factors: employment=7; hours=7; producer prices=3 and indices of
industrial production=4. Finally note that when estimating the elements of b θ
both a constant and linear time trend are included in the various Z matrices.
Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
Two-Digit SIC Codes
SIC Code Industry
20 Food and Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel & Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics
24 Lumber & Wood Products (exc. Furniture)
25 Furniture & Fixtures
26 Paper & Allied Products
27 Printing, Publishing & Allied Industries
28 Chemicals & Allied Products
29 Petroleum Reﬁning & Related Industries
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31 Leather & Leather Products
32 Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete Products
33 Primary Metal Industries
34
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery
& Transportation Equipment
35
Industrial & Commercial Machinery
&C o m p u t e rE q u i p m e n t
36
Electronic & other Electrical Equipment &
Components (exc. Computer Equipment)
37 Transportation Equipment
38
Measuring, Analyzing, & Controlling Instruments; Photo-
graphic, Medical & Optical Goods; Watches & Clocks
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
20-23,26-31 Non-Durable Goods
24-25, 32-39 Durable Goods
NBER Annual Two-Digit Data
Ni Number of production workers (thous.)
Hi Number of production worker hours (mill of hours)
yi Real total value of shipments ($mill.1987)
mi Real total cost of materials ($mill.1987)
Y v,i Nominal total value added ($mill.)
Pi Deﬂator for yi (1987=1)
Pm,i Deﬂator for mi (1987=1)
26BLS Quarterly Two-Digit Data
Wi Ave hourly earning of production workers
Related Regressors
The 24 BLS employment variables used to distribute Ni include:
1. Aggregate manufacturing employment
2. Aggregate production worker employment
3. Durable industries employment
4. Durable industries production employment
5. Non-durable industries employment
6. Non-durable industries production employment
7-24. Two digit total employment by industry (except SICs 36 & 38)
The 21 BLS hours variables used to distribute Hi include:
1. Ave weekly hours of production workers for manufacturing
2. Ave weekly hours of durable industries production workers
3. Ave weekly hours of non-durable industries production workers
4-21.
Two digit average weekly hours of production workers
(by industry except SICs 36 & 38)
27The 23 FRB industrial production indices used to distribute yi & mi include:
1. Total index
2. Manufacturing
3. Durable consumer goods
4. Non-durable consumer goods
5. Miscellaneous durable goods
6. Materials
7. Durable goods materials
8. Other durable materials
9. Non-durable goods materials
10. Energy materials
11. Automotive products




16. Consumer energy products
17. Business equipment
18. Transit equipment
19. Defence and space equipment




Other business supplies ex. energy, motor
vehicles & parts., & high-technology
28The 43 BLS producer prices used to distribute Pi & Pm,i include:
1. All commodities
2. Farm products
3. Processed foods and feeds
4. Textile products and apparel
5. Hides, skins, leather, and related products
6. Fuels and related products and power
7. Chemicals and allied products
8. Rubber and plastic products
9. L u m b e ra n dw o o dp r o d u c t s
10. Pulp, paper, and allied products
11. Metals and metal products
12. Machinery and equipment
13. Furniture and household durables
14. Non-metallic mineral products
15. Miscellaneous products
16. Total durable goods
17. Total non-durable goods
18. Manufactured goods
19. Durable manufactured goods
20. Non-durable manufactured goods
21. Total raw or slightly processed goods
22. Durable raw or slightly processed goods
23. Non-durable raw or slightly processed goods
24. Industrial commodities
25. Farm products, processed foods and feeds
26. Steel mill products
27. Finished steel mill products
28. Crude materials
29. Crude foodstuﬀsa n df e e d s t u ﬀs
30. Crude non-food materials except fuel
31. Crude fuel
32. Crude materials less agricultural products
33. Intermediate materials, supplies and components
34. Food manufacturing
35. Components for manufacturing
36. Processed fuels and lubricants
37. Manufactured animal feeds
38. Intermediate materials less foods and feeds
39. Finished goods
40. Finished consumer goods
41. Finished consumer foods
42. Finished consumer foods, processed
43. Finished consumer goods excluding foods
29Appendix 2 - Operationalising the Sectoral NKPC
We next reformulate the Phillips curve described by (28) to obtain a spec-
iﬁcation more appropriate for estimation. To do so consider the element of
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where wi,m = W
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t − b Pi
t)+( ψi − 1)b yi
t).
Here we can relate the combinations of production function parameters to la-
bor share variables based on gross rather than value-added output. Therefore,
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30We can rewrite this in a more conventional form, by deﬁning a gross-output
based measure of labor share,
b si
t = c Wi
t − b Pi
t + b Hi
t − b yi
t. (49)
Using the log-linearised version of the ﬁrst-order condition for labor demand
this can be re-written as,
b e s
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t.
This measure of marginal costs can be substituted into our sectoral Phillips
curve to give equation (30) in the main text.
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